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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--ooOoo·-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BERnARD LAWRENCE ALEXANDER, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
--ooOoo--
APPELLAiiT'S BRIEF 
--ooOoo--
. 
• 
. 
. 
. 
. 
STATEMK~T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 9856 
This case concerns (1) the validity of 
an original sentence of "not less than 
one year" to the Utah State Prison for the 
offense of issuing a check against insuf-
ficient funds and (2) the subsequent 
modifications of that sentence on motion 
by the state, after it had been fully 
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served, to a sentence of "not less than 
five years'' to the Utah State Prison. 
DISPOSITION II~ THE LOWER COURT 
After the defendant had fully served 
the original sentence of not to exceed 
one year in the State Prison, the lower 
court, by a judge different from the one 
who had imposed the original one year 
sentence, resentenced the defendant, 
nunc pro tunc, to a term not to exceed 
five years and remanded him to the 
custody of the State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks a determination 
(1) that the original sentence was a 
valid sentence for the maximum period of 
one year, (2) that the modification of 
that sentence to a sentence not to 
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exceed five years is void, and (3) that 
the defendant has fully served the law-
ful term imposed upon him. 
STATE~~~T OF THE FACTS 
(The defendant-app~llant will be 
referred to as defend&""lt~ "T" refers 
to the transcript of testimony. "R'' 
refers to the ::-ecord ~~hich is separate 
from the transcript cf testimony &1d in 
which the papers do not appear to be in 
logical sequence. The few items in a 
Supplemental Record will be so desig-
nated.) 
After being incarcerated in the Weber 
Co~~ty jail for three months, most of 
which was spent in solitary confinement, 
(T. 11) the defendant pleaded guilty 
before Judge John F. Wahlquist to a 
charge of issuing a check against insuf-
ficient funds. (R. 21) Judge Wahlquist 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
requested a presentence report and set a 
date for sentencing. (R* 21) 
On December 26, 1961, the date set for 
sentencing, the district attorney recom-
mended a period of o~e year but had some 
reluctance with referE::·ncG to the county 
jail because of the fact that the defen-
dant had already spent three months in 
solitary confinement, and because there 
were unpleasantries in the jail. (T. 26) 
In the discussion at this time among 
Cocrt, counsel and defendant the prob-
lems incident to a one year sentence in 
the county jail were discussed. (T. 24-
28) There is no mention in the record 
of intention or recommendation for a 
longer sentence. (T. 24-28) 
Shortly before passing sentence, the 
Court said, "And I don't want you to be 
4 
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in a long time this time. I want you 
to know you are going to get a fair 
chance. At the same time I can't put 
you back in the county jail. It isn't 
equipped to hold you. You will end up 
sitting in solitary the whole time. 
You won't see a radio nor a movie.'' 
(T. 27, 28) The Court then stated that 
he war.;~:ed to give the defendant a sen-
tence of one year so that he could give 
an accounting of himself. (T. 28) 
In the course of the discussion, the 
Court sentenced the defendant to one 
year in the state prison (T. 28, Line 
16). As the final operative act in the 
record for that day, the Court pronounced 
the following sentence: "I sentence you 
to serve a term in the Utah State Prison 
not to exceed one year." (T. 28, Lines 27-29) 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The document captioned 1tJ\ldgment, sen-
te;:'lce and commitment" is worded somewhat 
diff~rently from the oral sentence pro-
nounced in open court in that that docu-
ment carries the additional comment 
(apparently inserted with a different 
typewriter) ''the last four years of the 
'not to exceed 5 years' contemplated by 
the statute is hereby suspended as an act 
of mercy because of the great injustices 
that were suffered by the defend&it in 
the past. •• It carries the statement that 
sentence was to begin December 26, 1961. 
(R. 22) 
The defendant immediately began serving 
his sentence. He did not appeal. The 
state did not appeal. 
By a letter dated November 29, 1926, the 
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defendant asked Judge Wahlquist if, in 
the event the Board of Pardons ignored 
the one year sentence, a Writ of Error 
Coram Nobis would be the appropriate 
remedy. Although this letter of the 
29th of November, is included in the 
record on this appeal no minute entry 
was ever made in the trial court rec-
ords concerning it, nor does it bear 
any identifying filing stamp. 
By motion filed in the afternoon of 
December 19, 1963, the attorney general 
moved to modify the sentence. (R. 26) 
The record does not show service of this 
motion on the d~~endant, but the defendant 
was brought into court on the 24th of 
December, at which time Judge Wahlquist 
transferred the case to Judge Norseth's 
court. (R. 31) Judge Norseth continued 
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th~ case to the 27th of December. (R. 33) 
At the hearing on the 27th of December, 
1962, Judge Wahlquist, called as a witness, 
explained his reasons for the one year sen-
tence: He said the defendant's record was 
almost fantastic. (T. 11) He had been in 
jail for six months before being brought 
to Utah on the present charge. (T.ll) The 
defendant had spent most of the next three 
months before trial in solitary confine-
ment; he had had difficulty with his attor-
ney; and he was combatant by nature and 
had been done injustices in the past. (T.ll) 
Mr. Tite, the Probation Officer who had 
prepared the presentence report, and 
Mr. Newey, the District Attorney, were 
satisfied that the defendant had served 
tWice on convictions later set aside. (T. 13) 
In fact, he had served three times for 
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convictions which had been set aside. 
(T. 13) He took these matters into con-
sideration in sentencing defendant. (T. 13) 
The probation officer believed the def-
endant somewhat combatant in nature and 
somewhat paranoid, (T. 14) but both he 
and the judge felt it would be best just 
once to deal fairly with the defendant 
and give him a better chance of getting 
by in society when he was released. 
(T. 15) The judge talked with the pro-
bation officer for some time. (T. 15) 
The probation officer felt the defendant 
was a source of trouble in the county 
jail, that the jailers had not been 
unfair with defendant, but nonetheless 
defendant had served the last three 
months in solitary. (T. 15, 16) The 
probation officer was concerned about 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant's mental health. (T. 16) 
The judge testified that the district 
attorney recommended one year in jail, 
except for the reservation about the 
unpleasantries involved. (T. 16) The 
district attorney had no objection to 
the one year term. (T. 16) 
The judge repeated that both he and the 
probation officer felt it was one time 
when obvious fair play might pay off. 
(T. 17) 
The judge intended the one year to be 
served in the county jail, except for 
the report from the probation officer 
that the defendant was not getting along 
in the county jail. (T. 17) 
The proceedings on the 18th of Decem-
ber, 1962, when the plea of guilty was 
10 
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entered and the presentence report was 
requested, and the proceedings on the 
26th of December, 1962, when the orig-
inal sentence was pronounced were read 
by the court reporter. (T. 20-28) The 
defendant was examined and cross exam-
ined. (T. 3-9, 29-35) The presentence 
report was received in evidence (T. 13) 
as was a copy of the letter from Judge 
Wahlquist to the Board of Pardons. 
(T. 18) 
At the te~ination of the hearing, 
Judge Norseth expressed the view that 
the original sentence was illegal. It 
was his opinion that he had no recourse 
but to resentence the defendant to a 
term not to exceed five years in the 
state prison. (T. 42, 43) He did not 
feel that he could legally sentence the 
11 
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defendant to a term to the county jail 
nunc pro tunc~ (T. 43) He declined to 
sentence the defendant to a sentence of 
not to exceed one year in the county 
jail to commence then. (To 44) Judge 
Norseth resentenced the defendant to 
serve not to exceed five years in the 
state penitentiary, sentence to date 
from the original date of incarceration. 
(T. 43) The defendant was remanded to 
the state prison. (T. 44) 
On December 31, 1962, Judge Wahlquist 
informed defendant, in effect, that 
counsel would be appointed for him. 
(R. 28) Twice the defendant wrote Judge 
Wahlquist to say that counsel had not 
appeared. (R. 30, 34) On February 20, 
1963, no counsel having appeared to 
assist him, defend~~t filed his own 
notice of appeal. 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RESENTENCE TO A TERM OF 
NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS IS VOID 
BECAUSE TRE ORIGINAL SENT&~CE OF 
NOT TO EXCEED ONE YEAR IN THE STATE 
PRISON WAS A VALID S&~TENCE AS TO 
TINE, EVEJ.~ IF INCORRECT AS TO PLACE. 
After spending almost three months in 
solitary confinement in the Weber County 
Jail, the defendant pleaded guilty before 
Judge Wahlquist to the offense of utter-
ing a check against insufficient funds, 
a violation of Utah Code Anno. 1953, 
76-20-11, as amended. This section pro-
vides that such an offense "is punish-
able by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than one year, or in the 
state prison for not more than five years"" 
13 
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In addition to this choice the trial 
court has wide discretion vested in him 
by virtue of Utah Code l~o. 1953, 77-
35-17, to suspend the imposition or the 
execution of a sentence and place the 
defendant on probation, if it appears 
compatible with the public interest. 
The only conditions which are expressly 
statutorily stated as conditions of the 
probation refer to the payment of fines, 
restitution and reparation, and support 
of dependents. However, the impostion 
of other conditions has been approved by 
the courts ~~d it is customary practice 
to impose such conditions to the proba-
tion as to the court may deem desirable, 
including the condition that the defen-
dant spend some time in confinement. 
14 
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In the instant case the trial court had 
available the various alternatives sanc-
tioned expressly by the statute and by 
customary usage, which included, the 
one year in the county jail, the five 
years in the state prison, or the suspen-
sion of the imposition or execution of the 
sentence ru1d the placing of the defen-
dant on probation under such conditions 
as the trial court may have deemed appro-
priate, including the condition that the 
defendant spend some time in confinement 
as a condition precedent to the probation. 
There is vested in the Board of Pardons 
the power to permit prisoners in the 
county jail or state prison to go on 
parole. Utah Code !~no. 1953, 77·62-9o 
In the instant case the trial 
court sought and received the counsel 
15 
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and assistance of the Adult Parole and 
Probation Department. (R. 21) The dis-
trict attorney was present at and parti-
cipated in the proceedings to determine 
the sentence. 
The trial judge, upon the advice and 
with the assistru1ce of the presentence 
report, determined that a one year con-
finement would be appropriate in the 
case. (R. 24-28) This was also the dis-
trict attorney's recommendation. ~(I 26) 
The record allows of no question but 
that the trial court intended to impose 
a one year sentence upon the recommenda-
tion of the probation officer, ru1d the 
district attorney. (R. 28) It was felt 
that it would be far better that for 
once in his life the defendant be 
treated fairly, that he be given a 
16 
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chance at rehabilitation while incar-
cerated and &, opportunity upon release 
to take his place in society. (R. 15, 17) 
The Court felt a five year term, ~,der 
the peculiar circumstances of the case, 
would not accomplish this end. The 
probation officer felt the same way. The 
district attorney concurred. (R. 16) 
However, because of the peculiar cir-
cumstances involved in this case, cir-
cumstances which have not come to our 
attention in any other case which we 
have read, the Court felt that it would 
be better for the defendant to serve this 
year in the state prison rather than in 
the county jail. (R. 17) 
Considering the wide discretion lodged 
in the sentencing court, the discretion 
to choose between alternative sentences, 
17 
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the power to suspend imposition of the 
sentence, the power to suspend execu-
tion of the sentence, the power to 
impose conditions upon his probation, 
including the condition that the def-
endant spend time in confinement, the 
sentence to a term not to exceed one 
year was a valid sentence for that 
period of time. The fact that it was 
imposed in the prison rather than the 
county jail should not alter this con-
clusion. 
The statute authorizing p~~ishments 
provides for two punishments, one p~i­
ishment less onerous than the other in 
both time and place. Time, of course, 
is more significant in determining the 
degree of burden imposed by a sentence; 
place, while not to be ignored, is 
18 
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subordinate to time. In the instant 
case the Court had the power to sen-
tence to the less onerous term as to 
both time and place and desired to do 
so. Because of circumstance ~&ique 
to this case, the Court, the probation 
officer and the district attorney felt 
that the place authorized for the less 
onerous combination would be inapprop-
riate. Accordingly the sentence was 
for the less onerous timeo The sen-
tence in this case was a sentence of 
not to exceed one year in the state 
prison. (T. 28, lines 27-29) 
The sentence is the oral pronow1ce-
ment of the pm1ishment imposed by the 
judge. State v. Dowthard, 92 Ariz. 
44, 373 P.2d 357 (1962). Utah Code 
Anno~ 1953, 77-35-3, provides that in 
19 
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the case of felony, the defendant must 
be personally present, but in the case 
of a misdemeanor, judgment may be pro-
nounced in his absence. Utah Code Anno. 
1953, 77-35-11, provides that if, at the 
time set for sentencing, no sufficient 
cause is alleged or showt~ as to why it 
should not be pronounced, sentence must 
thereupon be renderedo It was, and it 
was a sentence to "a tenn in the Utah 
State Prison not to exceed one year.•i 
(T. 28, lines 27-29) Accordingly, the 
comment on the order of commitment con-
cerning the suspending of the last five 
years of the sentence as an act of mercy 
c&,not alter the oral sentence's valid-
ity any more than one party to a written 
contract can alone alter the contract 
by written comments after the contract 
is entered into" 
20 
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In view of the wide discretion granted 
the trial court by law and by customary 
practice, the sentence of "11ot to exceed 
one year" to the state prison is a valid 
sentence. The imposition of punishment 
to a place other than that literally 
authorized by the statute does not make 
the sentence void, but at most merely 
voidable as to the excess, particularly 
where, as here, the defendant has served 
the sentence without complaint or appeal. 
The rule is w·\311 established that a 
sentence excessive as to some part is a 
valid sentence but that the excessive 
part is void or voidable. 
Abeyta v. People, 112 Colo. 49, 145 
P.2d 884 (1944); 
In re Chase, 18 Idaho 561 110 Pac. 
1036 (1910). 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91 
Pac. 137 (1907), the defendant was 
sentenced to, and incarcerated in, 
the state prison when it should have 
been the county jail& On a writ of 
habeas corpus he demanded release on 
the ground the sentence was void. 
The Court rejected this argument, 
holding that the error in the place of 
commitment may be rejected as surplus-
age and directing that the defendant be 
delivered to the county jail to serve 
the balance of his time. 
Even more so than in Ta~, it would be 
appropriate here to disregard as sur-
plusage the incorrectness as to place 
where the defendant has fully served a 
lawfully authorized term, even though 
in a place of confinement more onerous 
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than that literally called for by the 
statute. 
POINT II. ASSUMING THE HOTION TO NODIFY 
THE SENTENCE TO BE APPROPRIATE, IT ~lAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE SECOND JUDGE 
TO RESENTENCE THE DEFENDANT CONTRARY TO 
THE INTENTION OF THE ORIG!N.t\L SENTE:~CING 
JUDGE TI:-Ii•T THE INPRISONMENT NOT EXCEED 
ONE Y~'1.R. 
The record does not explain why the 
original judge did not hear the second 
proceeding. The judge who did resentence, 
a year after the original sentence, did 
not honor the intentions and lawfully 
authorized discretion of the original 
sentencing judge. It would appear from 
the record that this was done by the 
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second trial court upon the erroneous 
assumption that there was no alternative 
but to so do, for it is clear, without 
question, that the original sentencing 
judge intended incarceration for a 
period not to exceed one year. The 
second sentencing judge could have 
effected this intention by a modifica-
tion of the sentence to read county jail 
in place of state prison, or by other 
means, but he chose not to do so and 
instead resentenced the defendant to a 
term four hundred per cent greater than 
the term he had already fully served. 
This instance is similar to the situa-
tion in Saldana v. U. s., 365 U.S. 646 
(1961) where the first judge clearly 
intended to impose a 5-year sentence but 
a second judge imposed a 20-year sentence. 
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The Supreme Court said that the defendant 
had, by this action, been deprived of 
the fair administration of justice. 
They reduced the sentence to the orig-
inally intended five year term. 
We submit that the integrity of the 
judicial process requires that, in those 
few cases where a second judge must pass 
sentence on, or resentence, a prisoner, 
the second judge follow the intentions 
of the first judge in all instru1ces 
where it is manifiest what the first 
judge's intentions were and where such 
objectives can be lawfully accomplished~ 
This could have been accomplished in the 
instant case by any of several means, 
including the modification of the sen-
tence to have read "not to exceed one 
year in the county jail" nunc pro tunc, 
thus having fully and completely met the 
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express intention of the first judge as 
to the lawfully authorized sentence he 
desired that the defend&it serve. 
POINT III. THE FOUR HUNDRED PERCENT 
INCREASE OF DEFENDlu~T 0 S SEl~TE~:lCE 
· AFTER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE HAD BEEN 
FULLY SERVED VIOw\TES THE FORMER 
JEOPARDY Ai'lD THE DUE PROCESS PRO-
VISIONS OF THE STATE Ai'ID FEDERAL 
COHSTITUTIONS. 
The second judge was obligated to 
treat the sentence of the defendant as 
fully served not only because of the 
express intent of the first judge that 
the defendant serve not more than one 
year, but also because the Utah and the 
federal constitutions prohibit the 
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enlargement of a sentence in this manner~ 
~rticle 1, Section 12 of the Utah Con-
stitution provides that no person 13 shall 
e • • be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense.n The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which 
applies to state action through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, similarly provides 
"nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb." Article 1, Section 7 
of the Utah Constitution contains a 
similar due process provision to that of 
the Fourteenth /~endment to the United 
States Constitution. 
One of the rights of individuals pro-
tected by both the double jeopardy pro-
visions and the due process provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions 
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is that once a person has begun serving 
a valid sentence, that sentence shall not 
be augmented or increased. If this rule 
applies to an accused upon beginning the 
execution of his sentence, it must also 
apply to the accused who has fully served 
his sentence. 
While it may be that immediate rectifi-
cation of an error in the sentence may 
be valid as against constitutional attack, 
Bozza v. u.s., 330 u.s. 160 (1947), it is 
equally clear that to alter a sentence by 
increasing its severity after the defen-
dant has commenced serving it is pro-
scribed by the constitutional prohibitions 
against double jeopardy for these prohibi-
tions apply to double punishment as well 
as to a second trial. Ex parte Lru1g~, 85 
u.s. (18 Wall.) 163 (1374). 
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We are not unmindful of the decisions 
from a few state courts and the early 
decision from this court in Nutart v. 
Pra~~' 51 Utah 246, 170 Pac. 67 (1917), 
which until carefully analyzed and com .... 
pared with the facts of the instant case, 
the statutes involved in the instant 
case, and the constitutional protections 
afforded by the state and the federal 
constitutions might superficially 
appear to justify the action of the 
resentencing judge. However, they do 
not hold up under examinationQ 
For example, Mutart v. Pratt involved 
an entirely different factual and legal 
situation. The statute there involved 
did not require the sentencing judge 
to pronounce a sentence as to time in 
any manner whatsoever, but in fact 
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prohibited his so doing. In addition, 
in thnt cnse there wns absolutely 
no discretion in the sentencing judge 
to choose between different degrees of 
punishment. While it may be that the 
decision in that case could have been 
justified on grounds not stated in the 
opinion, it is clear that the extension 
of the unnecessary, implied dicta in 
that case concerning the non-necessity 
of the state to comply with even mini-
mum standards of procedural due process 
in the matter of sentences would be 
violative of both the double jeopardy 
and the due process clauses of the state 
and the federal constitutions if applied here~ 
Two recent cases do suggest some 
guidelines in this area. In Tahash v. 
~lements, 234 Ind. 197, 125 l~.E.2d 439 
(1955), the defendant was sentenced to 
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a 2-year sentence although the statute 
required an indeterminate sentence of 
from 2 to 5 years. The Court cites 
§ 9-1827, Burns' 1942 Replacement (now 
§ 9-1827~ Burns' 1956 Replacement) 
which provides (similar in effect to 
our Utah Code .:umo. 1953, 77-35-20) 
that an erroneous determinate sentence 
which should have been indeterminate 
shall be deemed to be the correct in-
determinate sentenceo The Supreme Court 
of Indiana said, at page 440: 
The only constitutional interpretation 
of this statute would be that 
it authorizes the correction of 
an erroneous sentence, but the 
proper procedure must include 
notice to the prisoner and his 
presence in court when the change 
of sentence is ordered. His day 
in court includes this appearancea 
The statute, taken alone, cannot 
change a sentence by the court. 
The handing down of a sentence is 
not a ministerial act, but is a judicial act. 
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The Court did not spell out what 
proper notice was but from the tenor 
of the case it is quite unlikely that 
notice given only a week prior to the 
expiration of the full sentence would 
meet the applicable constitutional 
test, particularly where the matter 
was not heard until after the actual 
end of the full sentencea 
In §Ranton v. Clapp, 78 Idahv 234, 
299 P.2d 1103 (1956) the Idaho Court, 
despite extremely harsh earlier cases, 
held that to apply the Idaho indeter-
minate sentence law literally would 
deprive the defendant of his valuable 
right to appeal, and that although an 
erroneou~ sentence could be corrected 
by a timely motion by the state or an 
appeal from an adverse ruling, where 
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the prisoner had served his sentence 
without either the timely motion or 
the appeal from a denial of such motion, 
the prisoner would be discharged although 
the statute called for a much longer sen-
tence. 
We respectfully submit that the state 
and federal double jeopardy and due 
process provisions limit the power of 
the legislature and prevent its calling 
black white and white black without 
regard to the concepts of procedural 
due process as suggested in ~hash and 
Spanton. 
POIHT IVe 'ffiE i~PEAL WAS TIHELY BECAUSE 
THE RESEHTENCE AFTER THE EXPI~\TION 
OF THE ORIGIN~·~L SENTENCE IS EITHER A 
"FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION" OR ".l\N' 
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ORDER HADE, AFTER JUDGMENT, AFFECT_ 
ING THE SUBST!aNTI.AL RIGHTS OF" TiiE 
DEFENDA.L~T. 
Upon request of the Court we are 
briefing the question of the timeli-
ness of the appeal. 
On the 27th of December, 1962, the 
defendant, after having fully served 
his original one-year term, was sen-
tenced to a term not to exceed five 
years. Despite requests for aid and 
fu, assurance of appointment of counsel, 
none appeared. (R. between 27 and 28, 
28, 30, 34) Within the two months pro-
vided for filing notices of appeal in 
criminal cases the defendant filed his 
notice himself. (Supplemental Record) 
Judge Wahlquist called the case a 
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matter of motion to modify sentence. 
(R. 31) Judge Norseth called it a 
hearing on a writ of habeas corpus~ 
(R. 32) Defendant called it a writ 
of habeas corpus or a coram nobis pro-
ceeding~ (Supplemental Re~ord) 
We long ago dispensed with the notion 
that mislabeling a pleading or other 
paper was fatal and have adopted tr.e 
view that it is the substance of a 
matter that counts; not the name it may 
erroneously be given by counsel• or by 
the Court, let alone by a layman. 
The question is not whether this was 
in whole or in part a habeas corpus or 
coram nobis proceeding, but whether it 
comes within the scope of the statute 
authorizing appeals in criminal matterso 
Utah Code Aru~o. 1953, 77-39-3, provides 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''i~ appeal may be taken by the defendant; 
(1) From a final judgment of conviction. 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of the 
party. •: We submit that the resentence 
comes within both of these provisions. 
It is clear from the record that the 
resentencing proced,..lre C.)ald only :tave 
bee:1 prompted by the Statei s m=>tiol"l to 
modify. It cannot be denied that the 
defendan~ was at this time given an 
opportun··Lcy to present his side of the 
matter, ~hich he did, but this wa~ 
equally i~ opposition to the State's 
motion as well as, if at all, a pro-
cedure in the nature of a writ of habeas 
corpus or coram nobis. 
The term judgment of conviction refers 
to the sentence. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 
2d 117~ 262 P.2d 753 (1953). 
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In State v. Sawyer, 54 Utah 275, 
182 Pac. 206 (1919) the verdict was 
rendered on May 17, 1918, but sentence 
was not pronounced ~~til Sept. 21. 
Notice of appeal was filed the same day 
and was held timely. Had the time run 
from the rendering of th3 verdict, it 
would have been too late.. The Coul:'t 
sai:.1; t'[T]he judgment Up:>n th'3 verdict 
was not rendered and entered until 
Septembe~ 21, 1918, o o • Therefore 
this app2.~1 was taken in time~" 
In any Gvent, the resentencing to a 
term four hundred p,3:rcent greater than 
the original sentence, after it had 
been fully served, must come within 
the scope of an order made after judg-
ment (if it not be deemed a judgment) 
affecting the substantial rights of the 
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party. See Adamson v. Brockba.Ylk, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947)• 
Even if the Court should find that 
this case is a eivi1 and not a criminal 
matter, serious constitutional problems 
under both the state and the federal 
constitutions may exist because of the 
failure to provide the defendant with 
counsel ~.n time to perfect his appeal. 
Section 12 of Article 1 of the Utah Con-
stitution protects the right of convic-
ted persons to an appeal. Such a right 
would also come under the due process 
clause of Section 7 of Article 1 of the 
Utah Constitution. That such a right to 
counsel on appeal in state cases is also 
protected by the United States Constitu-
tion has recently been affirmed in the 
rlcl 
case of Douglas v. California, 9 L.Ed.A8ll 
(1963). 
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We suboit that failure to provide 
co~1sel in time to perfect an appeal 
from the resentence comes within the 
ambit of the Utah and the federal 
constitutions and, were it to result 
in the loss to the defenda~t of his 
one right to appeal from the resentence, 
it would deprive him of a most val-
uable right protected by both con-
stitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant respectfully submits 
that the trial court erred in sentencing 
him to a term not to exceed five years 
in the state prison for the reason that 
he had already served a valid sentence 
of not to exceed one year for the same 
offense. 
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Defendant prays that this court 
determine that the original sentence 
was a valid sentCl"lce of a term 
not to exceed one year, that the 
rcsentencG to a term not to exceed 
five years is void, and that the def-
endant has fully served the lawful 
term imposed upon him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBE..~T L. SCH1'1ID and 
LESTER J. l1AZOR 
College of Law 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City 12, Utah 
Attorneys for the 
Defendru1t-Appcllant 
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